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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROVO CITY 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
JAMES GEDO, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20050087-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred when it basically ignored pro se 
motions filed by the Defendant for more than a year and should have required 
the prosecution to comply with the Rules of Procedure which require a 
response to a motion within 10 days. In fact, eventually the Court did order to 
the City to respond to the motions and ordered that the City comply with the 
Rules of Civil Procedure which require a response to a motion within 10 days, 
and even then did not require the City to respond to all of the motions which 
1 
had been filed and in fact simply denied the motions without a full review. 
This motion is preserved by appeal by Gedo's hearing on that issue held May 
12,2003. This question is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness, 
State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (UT 1995). 
2. Whether the Trial Court erred when it ordered that Defendant 
could not submit any of his own motions, as this denied him his constitutional 
right to defend himself. The issue was raised by Defendant himself in the 
above hearing held May 12, 2003 and also on July 21, 2003. This question is a 
question of law which is reviewed for correctness, State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 
1196, 1199 (UT 1995). 
3. Whether the trial court erred when it found the Defendant 
competent to proceed to trial when the evaluating doctor found that the 
Defendant suffered from a mental illness and had extreme difficulty "engaging 
in reasons choice of legal strategies and options." This issue was preserved for 
trial in hearing regarding competency held September 13, 2004. This 
question is a mixed question of law and fact. The correct standard to use in 
determining competency is a question of law, which is reviewed for 
correctness, while the factual findings of the court are questions of fact and are 
reversed only upon a clearly erroneous finding of fault, State v. Harmon, 910 
P.2dll96, 1199 (UT 1995). 
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All controlling statutory provisions and rules are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
James Luis Gedo appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment 
of the Fourth District Court after being convicted by a jury of Disorderly 
Conduct, an Infraction, and Resisting or Interfering with an Officer in the 
Discharge of Duty, a Class B Misdemeanor. James Luis Gedo's Co-Defendant 
in his matter is Miguel David Gedo, his brother, who is filing a concurrent 
appeal in this matter in Case Number 20050086-CA. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
James Luis Gedo was charged by information filed in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court alleging that on or about March 5, 2003 he had committed the 
offense of Disorderly Conduct, a Class C Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 
76-9-102(l)(b); Utah Code Annotated, and Interference with Arresting 
Officer, a Class B misdemeanor, a violation of Section 76-8-305, Utah Code 
Annotated. 
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On March 24, 2003, the Defendant appeared for arraignment before 
Judge Guy R. Burningham; counsel Laura H. Cabanilla was present, and the 
pretrial hearing and hearing on motions was scheduled for May 12, 2003. 
On March 27, 2003 Defense counsel filed with the Trial Court, packets of 
motions received from the Defendant. Defendant's counsel did not advise him 
to seek these motions, which he wished filed against her advice. These 
motions were similar in nature to other motions filed previously in the 
Defendant's other cases before the court; and were also treated similarly by 
Defendant's counsel. 
Therefore in filing the motions, counsel attached them to a cover sheet 
which stated they were being filed at the request of the client but against the 
advice of counsel. This same procedure was also filed in Defendant's other 
cases which were also proceeding at this time through the lower courts. This 
same issue is raised separately in Appellant's Case 20040225-CA. 
Additional pretrial motions of the Defendant were similarly filed with 
this type of cover sheet from counsel on April 14, 2003; April 22, 2003; and 
May 12, 2003. These pretrial motions are too numerous to list here, but are 
attached. 
The Prosecution did file an objection to some of the motions on April 
28, 2003. Provo City filed an Objection to Request for a Six Month Hiatus on 
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All Cases; Objection to Defendant's Order to Show Cause for Removing 
Defendant's Mexican License Plates Without Court Order, Without 
Jurisdiction and Without Cause; however, Provo City did not file any written 
objections to the other motions filed by the Defendant. 
Further, the Defendant filed his other motions, not through counsel, on 
May 12, 2003, the date of the hearing on the motions. 
The City of Provo never responded in writing to these motions. On 
March 24, 2003, the matter came before the court on hearing on other cases of 
the Defendant's which were before the court. The Defendant had not yet been 
arraigned on this new charge; however at this hearing on the defendant's other 
cases, Counsel for the Defendant raised the issue of the motions not having 
been responded to or addressed by the Court. 
Counsel had previously filed notices to submit in these separate cases. 
The court at that time, noted that new motions had been filed by the Defendant, 
the Court stated that the time for the City to respond to these motions was 
controlled by the rules, but took no further action other than to continue the 
hearing to allow the City further time to respond. Provo City did not respond 
to the motions. 
On May 12, 2003, the matter came before the court on hearing, and 
counsel for the Defendant again raised the issue of the unresponded to motions, 
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referring to motions filed in this case, and in the Defendant's other cases then 
before the Court, (p.7 of May 12, 2003 hearing). The Court ruled that all 
motions filed by the Defendant were denied, finding them "inappropriately 
filed, that they request irrelevant and extraneous matters," (p. 42 and of May 
12, 2003 transcript). Further, on p. 46, the Court relieved the City of a 
responsibility to respond in accordance with the rules of procedure, stating, "I 
think it would be a waste of time really to have the cities respond to these." 
However, the Court did grant one of Defendant's motions, which was his 
motion for a six month hiatus in the case, (p. 55). 
The Defendant was further instructed not to file any motions unless they 
were filed through his attorney; and the attorney was instructed not to file 
motions on Defendant's behalf unless in her opinion, "they were meritorious or 
at least have had valid arguments for their positions, appropriate and relevant," 
(p. 53 and 54.) 
On July 21, 2003, the matter again came before the court on a Motion to 
Withdraw as Counsel filed by Gedo's counsel, Laura Cabanilla. After an 
agreement was entered into regarding client conduct, Laura Cabanilla agreed to 
stay on as counsel. This motion had been filed because of the difficulties in 
dealing with Defendant Gedo. Gedo's appointed counsel complained of his too 
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frequent telephone calls and visits to the office and inappropriate and rude 
behavior to staff, as well as difficulties in the client and attorney relationship. 
At the same time an issue was raised in that the Defendant had been barred by 
the 4th District Court clerks in filing any motions with the Court, whether they 
were pleadings in this case or civil cases. The court stated the matter would be 
discussed at the next judge's meeting, (see notes entered in court computer 
docket for July 21, 2003). 
Again on December 17, 2003, another Motion for Withdrawal of 
Counsel was filed, due to the same problems as had previously occurred; 
although this motion was at the request of the client rather than counsel 
because of Gedo's frustration that his counsel was not filing the motions he 
desired, this regardless of the Court's order that counsel not file motions unless 
they were made by counsel. At the hearing on January 9, 2004 regarding that 
motion, the motion was withdrawn by counsel when the client stated he agreed 
it was in his best interest to keep counsel. 
On June 1, 2004, a motion was made for a Competency Evaluation of 
the Defendant's competency to proceed. This motion was made by the 
Defendant's counsel but was vehemently opposed by the Defendant. 
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The matter proceeded to trial, and the cases of both the Defendant James 
Gedo and Miguel David Gedo were combined at their request, so that they 
could sit together at counsel table. 
Jury trial was then held December 8 and 9, 2004 in front of Judge 
McVey. At the trial defendant was found Guilty of Disorderly Conduct as an 
Infraction (he was found Not Guilty of the Class C Misdemeanor); and Guilty 
of Interference with an Arresting Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
On January 20, 2005 the Defendant was sentenced to statutory 
maximums on a Class B misdemeanor, with 10 days imposed and the 
remainder stayed. Defendant served this sentence and is not currently 
incarcerated. 
On January 25, 2005, a timely appeal was filed. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The circumstances surrounding the incident leading to the charges 
against the Defendant are as follows: On March 5, 2002, Defendant James 
Gedo and his co-defendant, and brother, Miguel David Gedo, were at their 
home located at 1741 North 450 West, Provo, Utah. On that same date, Provo 
City Parking Cadet Linda Trotter noticed a red and gray GMC Suburban with a 
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license plate out of Utah, 148ZRG with a registration display showing the plate 
expired 01/00. 
Cadet Trotter testified that as she entered the plate information into her 
computer to write a ticket for this infraction, information came back from her 
accounting department that the vehicle had four or more unpaid parking tickets. 
Cadet Trotter stated that she then contacted dispatch and had them run the 
plate. Cadet Trotter stated that she wished to do a VIN search but that the VIN 
on the dash was covered and the doors were locked. She stated she crawled 
under the vehicle on both sides but could not observe one under the vehicle. 
Cadet Trotter then called for a tow truck driver who she then asked to 
open the door so that she could access the VIN number (p.22). He did open the 
door and Cadet Trotter obtained the VIN number which registered to a Kenneth 
Parker of American Fork, Utah (proffer of Trotter's testimony, p. 6) 
This VIN number was registered to a different plate, Utah 741JHE 
which had been sold by the Parkers in 1999, (p. 7). Therefore, the license plate 
with the parking tickets belonged to a different vehicle; however, Cadet Trotter 
instructed the tow truck driver to impound the vehicle on the basis of the 
unpaid parking tickets (p. 22-36, 38 of Trotter's testimony). (The Gedos 
testified that they had recently, in the last several months, purchased the 
vehicle. This information comes from a proffer of testimony p. 7). 
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Trotter testified that she parked on the other side of the street, some 
distance away, while the tow truck officer began to hook up the vehicle to tow 
it. She testified that she would not have been seen, and in fact when she 
noticed a male individual exit the house and begin to appear to argue with the 
tow truck driver, it did not appear that this person was aware of her presence, 
(p. 22-36). 
The tow truck driver began to place his lift under the Suburban in order 
to tow it (p.23). As this occurred, one of the brothers became aware of the tow 
truck driver's attempt to tow the vehicle. He then approached and made a 
statement to the effect of, "you're not going to steal my car...." (p. 37 Trotter's 
testimony). 
That individual then reentered the house and both the individuals exited. 
Testimony was presented that Miguel Gedo entered the vehicle and attempted 
to start it. It did not start and apparently was not running. At this point, Cadet 
Trotter, who had been parked on the other side of the street and away from the 
tow truck driver, felt that the tow truck driver needed assistance and drove up 
to the Suburban, where Miguel Gedo was seated in the driver's side, parallel to 
it and in front of the Gedo Suburban. She testified that he opened his car door 
into her jeep with such force and violence that he created a dent and three deep 
scratches to her vehicle. 
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Miguel's testimony was that he opened the door because her vehicle was 
so close to his as he was exiting his vehicle that he needed to do so to protect 
his leg, and that his car door struck her mirror, not the door panel Other 
evidence presented at trial was not consistent with the cadet's testimony 
regarding damage, and Miguel Gedo was found not guilty at trial for the 
charge of Criminal Mischief, for which this incident was the basis of that 
charge. 
Continuing with the parking cadet's testimony, Miguel Gedo then was 
able to start the vehicle with the assistance of his brother, and the vehicle was 
driven off of the tow truck lift, and parked in the Gedo's driveway. Both 
Gedos testified that after exiting the vehicle Miguel Gedo thereupon went to 
the front of the vehicle, where the hood had already been placed up by James 
Gedo, and began working on the engine while James Gedo then entered the 
vehicle. Miguel Gedo started the vehicle, while James Gedo drove it off of the 
tow truck lift by backing the vehicle up, almost on the vehicle parked behind 
the Suburban, which also belonged to the Gedos, and drove it off onto the curb 
and into the Gedo driveway, in their belief that the vehicle could not be taken 
once on private property. 
Cadet Trotter then testified that she drove into the driveway, parking 
behind the Suburban with her jeep in an effort to prevent the Suburban from 
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being driven away. She testified that James Gedo approached her vehicle, and 
screamed at her. Cadet Trotter called for backup and shortly thereafter several 
police vehicles arrived. Various testimonies was elicited from officers who 
testified that both brothers had separately and in different directions left the 
property, and were shortly located by different officers. Officers testified that 
they demanded the Defendants to stop, raise their hands and get down on the 
ground. 
This testimony was disputed by the Gedos who testified that they did not 
disobey the officers' commands. They were thereupon taken into custody and 
charged by Information alleging the offenses of Disorderly Conduct a Class C 
misdemeanor and Interference with an Officer in the Discharge of Duty, a 
Class B misdemeanor. 
Prior to trial and due to counsel's concerns over the Defendant James 
Gedo's psychological health, and counsel's difficulties with advising him and 
his inability to accept her legal advice which she believed was due to his 
apparent personality disorders, Defense counsel made a petition for a 
determination of competency, which was ordered by the court. Two doctors 
were appointed and made evaluations. 
On September 13, 2003; hearing was held on the issue of competency 
with both Dr. Patrick Panos, PhD and Dr. Cundick, PhD, were subpoenaed to 
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testify. Both doctors were present and had previously submitted Competency 
Evaluations. In preparing their evaluations, both doctors met with the 
Defendant for approximately two hours each and prepared evaluations which 
essentially stated that they found the Defendant competent to proceed, but with 
extreme reservations, since both doctors had concerns that due to the 
defendant's delusions he could not engage in a reasoned choice of legal 
strategies and options, as required by Section 77-15-5(a)(iv). (See evaluations 
submitted to Court which are part of court record). 
In their written evaluations, Dr. Panos and Dr. Cundick similarly found 
that James Gedo did suffer from various diagnosed mental illnesses but overall 
was able to understand the nature of the proceedings against him; and in all of 
the requirements set out in 77-15-5(4) met the competency requirements, 
except for 77-15-5(4)(iv), that he be able to engage in a reasoned choice of 
legal strategies and options. 
As their testimony would have been redundant, only Dr. Panos testified. 
He stated that he found that it would be difficult or impossible for the 
Defendant to accept his counsel's legal recommendations, if it conflicted with 
his own thinking, or dealt with his own legal matters. For instance, while 
James Gedo could appreciate that if another individual, not himself, was 
charged with a crime, but offered a deal whereby he pled to a lesser charge, 
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and perhaps avoid a stiffer penalty, he could understand and recommend that 
the individual engage in that process; however, when it came to himself, and 
his own legal matters the defendant exhibited such delusions that Dr. Panos 
believed it was likely impossible for him to engage in such a reasoned 
discussion. 
In their evaluations, the doctors noted that the Defendant believed that at 
trial he would be vindicated, and not only would he not go to jail, but that the 
officers and prosecutors, etc., would be sent to jail or prison by the jury. They 
variously describe that he was convinced and even gleeful, that he would 
receive a large financial settlement at the expense of the city for their crimes 
against him. (This even though he has no legal action pending or filed, and has 
not filed even a Notice of Claim against the City.) 
Dr. Panos testified at the competency hearing which was held September 
13, 2004. According to the transcript of his testimony on that date, he stated 
that the defendant James Gedo "had beliefs that would be considered extreme 
to the point that, that they would be considered delusional.. .[but] that the he 
was not mentally ill in the classical sense that was covered by the statute." 
(ppgs. 6-7). In his testimony Dr. Panos expressed frustration several times that 
he felt confined by the "statute." What this statute which defined mental 
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illness and constrained the doctor in his findings was is not clear, 1 as the 
statute regarding competency merely states that: 
a person is incompetent to proceed if he is suffering from a mental 
disorder or mental retardation resulting either in: 
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him or the punishment specified for the offense 
charged; or 
(2) his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the 
proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding," Section 77-15-2. 
Dr. Panos stated that "the type of mental illness he has is not 
really covered well by the statute.. .1 mean, he's not psychotic, he's not, 
he doesn't, his affect is, is normal." (p.9, 10). And that his mental illness 
"won't be treated by medications, hospitalization wouldn't, wouldn't 
have any impact on it," (p. 10). Dr. Panos then testified briefly about the 
definition of mental illness, saying "there's certain mental illnesses 
they're willing to look at. For example, they're not willing to look at 
personality disorder and this would be somewhat close to a personality 
disorder. Now is personality disorder a mental illness? In my mind it 
truly is." (p. 10). In response to the question, does he suffer from a 
substantial mental illness, Dr. Panos' reply was "yes." (p. 10). 
1
 Dr. Panos may have been referring to the DSM-IV Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders, 
Fourth Edition. However, certain diagnosis listed in that manual could describe the defendant: 297.1 
Delusional Disorder; 301.9 Personality Disorder NOS; etc. 
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Dr. Panos admitted in his testimony that he did not complete the 
report "for a good four to six weeks afterwards because I kept writing it 
and it was very frustrating because I kept changing my mind of how to 
phrase things and, because it's a very subtle case." (p. 11). Dr. Panos 
admitted he struggled with whether to find the Defendant competent, 
"because clearly things were going on that impact his, his ability to, to 
engage the, court or the judicial system in a reasonable manner. But, 
you know, it wasn't falling within the statute." (p.l 1). 
According to Section 77-15-5(a)(iv) UCA, the expert is asked to 
determine, among other factors, whether the defendant can "engage in 
reasoned choice of legal strategies and options." Regarding that factor, 
Dr. Panos testified that "I questioned whether he could rationally 
evaluate, you know, realistic options." (Panos Testimony p. 8). Dr. 
Panos went on to state that "no, he would not engage in reasonable 
consideration of options, that he would be locked into, to his, belief 
systems." (p. 8). And with respect to the defendant's relationship with 
his legal counsel, "he tended to lecture you about the legal precedence 
and the interpretation, and he did not see you as being knowledgeable in 
any realistic sense." (p.9) 
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With respect to a question posed by prosecutor Rick Romney as to 
whether the Defendant could make legal decisions when applied to his 
own situation, Dr. Panos replied that, "I see he's extreme to the point 
where there is no flexibility at all." (p. 13), 
Although the Defendant counsel argued that he be found not competent 
to proceed based on the Defendant's inability to engage in a reasoned 
discussion of options, and the defendant's inability to accept "what his attorney 
will tell him is the legal status when he very strongly believes that there are 
these other possibilities2 or that he's being persecuted," the Defendant was 
found competent to proceed. 
The Court ruled, finding that, "the Defendant was an extremely 
intelligent person who understands probably to a greater degree than most 
other members of society the nature of the proceedings against him and he is 
competent to understand that and.. .he was competent to participate 
meaningfully in the preparation and presentation of his defense. The lower 
Court found that "the only reservation that Dr. Panos had was in the area of . 
maybe Mr. Gedo not being willing to weigh, or not being able or willing to 
weigh pros and cons of accepting a plea bargain or something like that because 
he's elected to go to trial. And I think, I think that that's probably a pretty 
2
 Reference here is made to Dr. Panos' earlier testimony that one of the Defendant's delusions was that he 
believed he would receive redress in these matters from the federal court, or the World Court, and that his 
attorney could not persuade him otherwise, p. 8. 
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reasonable response of somebody that wants to go have their day in court.''1 
(p-19). 
The matter proceeded to trial, and the cases of both the Defendant James 
Gedo and Miguel David Gedo were combined at their request, so that they 
could sit together at counsel table. 
When the Court instructed the jury, he presented an instruction made at 
the request of Defendant's counsel, Instruction No. 25, "It is a defense to a 
prosecution under any statute or ordinance that the defendant, as a result of 
mental illness, lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense 
charged." 
In her closing statement, Defendant's counsel argued that the Defendant 
should not be found guilty because of his delusions and mental state. 
At sentencing, further reference was made to the Court to consider the 
statements of the doctors even in light of the Court's finding of competency, in 
that "the doctor found that he was mentally ill and that he was delusional but 
[sic] paranoid" (p.5 January 20, 2005 sentencing hearing). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant James Gedo is an individual who insists on "tilting at 
windmills," he is an often prickly and difficult person, and has certain 
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disabilities which were testified about at trial and at his competency hearing 
where Dr. Panos testified he has a "personality disorder" and "delusional 
thinking." This results in him often being at odds with the police, the courts, 
and even his appointed counsel. However, no matter how difficult he may be, 
or even how difficult he may at time even make things for himself, he is still 
entitled to equal protection under the law. 
The Defendant filed pro se motions, and other motions under a cover 
sheet through his attorney. Questions regarding the filing of this motion were 
preserved for hearing by this Court by the filing of the motions themselves, as 
well as hearing on the matter. The prosecution and the trial court ignored these 
motions, which is plain error for the trial court. The trial court erred when it 
basically ignored pro se motions filed by the Defendant for more than a year, 
then, after ordering the City to respond to the motions, and ordering that Provo 
City comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure which require a response to a 
motion within 10 days, after they failed to do so, did not require the City to 
respond to all of the motions which had been filed and in fact simply denied 
the motions without full review. This issue was preserved for appeal by 
Gedo's hearing on that issue held May 12, 2003. 
Also, the trial court erred when it ordered that Defendant could not 
submit any of his own motions, as this denied him his constitutional right to 
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defend himself. The acts by the Fourth District Court in not even accepting 
any documents filed by the Defendant further demonstrate the denial of his 
constitutional rights. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE REQUIRED THE PROSECUTION 
TO COMPLY WITH THE RULES OF PROCEDURE WHICH REQUIRE A 
RESPONSE TO A MOTION WITHIN 10 DAYS; SHOULD NOT HAVE 
IGNORED NOTICES TO SUBMIT REGARDING THESE MOTIONS AND 
THEN FINALLY ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTIONS WITHOUT A 
FULL AND FAIR REVIEW. 
Previous to the trial, Defendant had requested that numerous motions be 
filed with the Court. Defendant filed some motions on his own, and others 
through counsel. His attorney did not submit the motions through her own 
arguments, but instead, Counsel for the Defendant handled these motions 
requested by the Defendant by simply attaching them to a cover sheet which 
stated that the motions were filed with the Court at the request of the client, but 
against the advice of counsel. 
The Defendant continued to request that his counsel file various motions 
on his behalf, and Defendants counsel continued to file motions of this sort, 
calling the pleadings "Pre-Trial Motions of Defendant," with a cover sheet 
stating that the motions were filed April 14, 2003; April 22, 2003; and May 12, 
2003. After the Court ordered the City to respond to the motions, the 
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Prosecution did file an objection to some of the motions on April 28, 2003: 
Objection to Request for a Six Month Hiatus on All Cases; Objection to 
Defendant's Order to Show Cause for Removing Defendant's Mexican License 
Plates Without Court Order, Without Jurisdiction and Without Cause. 
The Defendant filed his own motions, not through counsel, on May 12, 
2003, the date of the hearing on the motions. 
The City of Provo never responded in writing to these motions. On 
March 24, 2003, the matter came before the trial court on hearing on other 
cases of the Defendant's which were before the court. The Defendant had not 
yet been arraigned on this new charge; however at this hearing on the 
defendant's other cases, counsel for the Defendant raised the issue of the 
motions not having been responded to or addressed by the trial court. Counsel 
had previously filed notices to submit in these separate cases. The court noted 
that new motions had been filed by the Defendant, the court stated that the time 
for the City to respond to these motions was controlled by the rules, but took 
no further action other than to continue the hearing to allow the City further 
time to respond. Provo City did not respond to the motions. 
On May 12, 2003, the matter came before the court on hearing, and 
counsel for the Defendant again raised the issue of the unresponded to motions, 
referring to motions filed in this case, and in the Defendant's other cases then 
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before the Court, (p.7 of May 12, 2003 hearing). The Court ruled that all 
motions filed by the Defendant were denied, finding them "inappropriately 
filed, that they request irrelevant and extraneous matters/5 (p. 42 and of May 
12, 2003 transcript). Further, on p. 46, the Court relieved the City of a 
responsibility to respond in accordance with the rules of procedure, stating, "I 
think it would be a waste of time really to have the cities respond to these." 
however, the Court did grant one of Defendant's motions, which was his 
motion for a six month hiatus in the case, (p. 55). 
The Defendant was further instructed not to file any motions unless they 
were filed through his attorney; and the attorney was instructed not to file 
motions on Defendant's behalf unless they were meritorious or at least have 
had valid arguments for their positions, appropriate and relevant, p. 53 and 54. 
In fact, clerks of the 4th District Court at this time refused to accept any 
motions which the Defendant attempted to file, even going so far as to refuse to 
accept even pleadings in civil cases the Defendant attempted to file. This 
matter was raised in hearing in July 21, 2003 and is mentioned in the court 
computer docket. 
Rule 7(b)(1) Motions, orders and other papers, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, states that "an application to the court for an order shall be by 
motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing, 
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shall state with particularity the grounds therefore, and shall set forth the relief 
sought." Gedo did meet this requirement with all of the series the motions 
filed by himself, and those filed through his attorney but with the cover sheet 
which stated that they were filed against the advice of counsel. 
Since the Defendant's various motions did set forth claims for relief, in 
accordance with Rule 8(a) URCP it would naturally follow that there should be 
some response to those claims for relief, and a failure of the City to respond to 
those claims for relief would be a failure to deny. Paragraph 8(d) URCP states 
that "[ajverments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, 
other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in 
the responsive pleading." Therefore, a failure of the prosecution to respond 
and deny the claim for relief would mean that they were admitted. 
There is, in these above statutes, no requirement that the motions or 
claims for relief actually be demonstrated to have merit first before filing. The 
determination of merit would occur at hearing. The simple decision of a 
prosecutor to ignore motions he deems to be baseless does not preserve the 
Defendant's due process rights. 
The court reminded the prosecution that they needed to follow the Rules 
of Civil Procedure, yet when they did not do so, the Court allowed and 
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overlooked that omission and simply denied the motions. By so doing, the 
Court effectively denied the Defendant his due process. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE DEFENDANT TO 
FILE ANY OF HIS OWN MOTIONS WITH THE COURT NOT FILED BY 
HIS ATTORNEY AS TO NOT ALLOW THIS IS AN INFRINGEMENT OF 
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure makes several 
requirements for pleadings, motions etc., which are filed with the court. Rule 
11(b) states that by, 
"presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the court (whether by 
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), an attorney or unrepresented 
party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and 
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of the 
litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are 
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; 
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary 
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support 
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence 
or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or 
belief 
When the Defendant's counsel simply filed his motions by attaching a 
cover sheet, which, although signed by the attorney, stated that the motions 
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were filed against the advice of counsel, counsel was, in effect, not certifying 
the motions as set out above. However, Gedo in his own motions did believe, 
to the best of his knowledge information and belief that the motions were 
proper. He did sign the motions which were submitted. Arguably, some of his 
motions and requests would appear so bizarre that our argument regarding the 
Defendant's incompetency should be strengthened. 
However, for the Court simply to not allow Gedo to file motions, and 
even as occurred later, instruct their clerks not to accept any paperwork from 
the Gedos that did not come through an attorney, was improper and a violation 
of Gedo5 s constitutional right of access to the court. This was a violation of the 
14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states that no State 
shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws." 
In response to the argument that Gedo could file motions through his 
attorney, or by himself if unrepresented, Section 12, Rights of Accused 
persons, Utah Constitution states that "In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel...." 
[emphasis added]. 
Therefore, Gedo should have been allowed the right to file motions on 
his own behalf, not necessarily only through counsel, and still receive the 
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benefit of counsel. That he was not allowed to do this was a violation of his 
constitutional rights and the charges against him should be ordered dismissed 
as a remedy. 
POINT III 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THE 
DEFENDANT COMPETENT TO PROCEED TO TRIAL WHEN THE 
EVALUATING DOCTOR FOUND THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD 
EXTREME DIFFICULTY "ENGAGING IN REASONED CHOICE OF 
LEGAL STRATEGIES AND OPTIONS." 
It is well established that due process requires that a defendant be 
mentally competent to plead guilty and to stand trial, State v. Arguelles, 63 
P.3d 73, (Utah Supreme Court, 2003). 
"A mentally incompetent defendant can provide no defense, and 
proceedings against such a defendant do not comport with due process." 
Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17, f 12, 20P.3d382 (quoting State v. Young, 780 
P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1989)); see also York v. Shulsen, 875 P.2d 590, 594 
(Utah Ct.App. 1994) ("Due process requires that a defendant be competent to 
plead guilty."); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 
103 (1975) (stating that prohibition against subjecting mentally incompetent 
defendant to trial is fundamental to adversarial system of justice). 
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Section 77—15-1 of the Utah Code mandates that "[n]o person who is 
incompetent to proceed shall be tried for a public offense." Utah Code Ann. § 
77—15—1 (2002). Section 77—15—2 defines a defendant's incompetency to 
proceed as an "inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him or of the punishment specified for the offense 
charged; or ... his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the 
proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2(l)-(2) (2002). 
In Arguelles, the Supreme Court of Utah held that "[i]n determining 
whether a defendant is competent to plead guilty, the trial court must consider 
whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as 
factual understanding of the proceedings against him." State v. Holland, 921 
P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Godinez v. 
Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993)). 
"'[Competency is established when a defendant can, but not necessarily will, 
assist or consult with counsel.'" State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19,151, 20 P.3d 
342 (quoting State v. Woodland, 945P.2d665, 668 (Utah 1997)). 
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Dr. Panos testified at a competency hearing which was held September 
13, 2004. According to the transcript of his testimony on that date, he stated 
that the defendant James Gedo "had beliefs that would be considered extreme 
to the point that, that they would be considered delusional.. .[but] that the he 
was not mentally ill in the classical sense that was covered by the statute." 
(ppgs. 6-7). In his testimony Dr. Panos expressed frustration several times that 
he felt confined by the "statute." What this statute which defined mental 
illness and constrained the doctor in his findings was is not clear,3 as the 
statute in Section 77-15-2, regarding competency merely states that: 
a person is incompetent to proceed if he is suffering from a mental 
disorder or mental retardation resulting either in: 
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him or the punishment specified for the offense 
charged; or 
(2) his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the 
proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding," 
Dr. Panos stated that "the type of mental illness he has is not 
really covered well by the statute.. .1 mean, he's not psychotic, he's not, 
he doesn't, his affect is, is normal." (p.9,10). And that his mental illness 
"won't be treated by medications, hospitalization wouldn't, wouldn't 
3
 Dr. Panos may have been referring to the DSM-IV Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders, 
Fourth Edition. However, certain diagnosis listed in that manual could describe the defendant: 297.1 
Delusional Disorder; 301.9 Personality Disorder NOS; etc. . 
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have any impact on it." (p. 10) Dr. Panos then testified briefly about the 
definition of mental illness, saying "there's certain mental illnesses 
they[re willing to look at. For example, they're not willing to look at 
personality disorder and this would be somewhat close to a personality 
disorder. Now is personality disorder a mental illness? In my mind it 
truly is." (p. 10). In response to the question, does he suffer from a 
substantial mental illness, Dr. Panos' reply was "yes." (p. 10). 
Dr. Panos admitted in his testimony that he did not complete the 
report "for a good four to six weeks afterwards because I kept writing it 
and it was very frustrating because I kept changing my mind of how to 
phrase things and, because it's a very subtle case." (p. 11). Dr. Panos 
admitted he struggled with whether to find the Defendant competent, 
"because clearly things were going on that impact his, his ability to, to 
engage the, court or the judicial system in a reasonable manner. But, 
you know, it wasn't falling within the statute." (p. 11). 
Also under Section 77-15-5(a)(iv) the expert is asked to 
determine, among other factors, whether the defendant can "engage in 
reasoned choice of legal strategies and options." Regarding that factor, 
Dr. Panos testified that "I questioned whether he could rationally 
evaluate, you know, realistic options." (Panos Testimony p. 8). Dr. 
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Panos went on to state that "no, he would not engage in reasonable 
consideration of options, that he would be locked into, to his, belief 
systems." (p. 8). And with respect to the defendant's relationship with 
his legal counsel, "he tended to lecture you about the legal precedence 
and the interpretation, and he did not see you as being knowledgeable in 
any realistic sense." (p.9) 
With respect to a question posed by prosecutor Rick Romney as to 
whether the Defendant could make legal decisions when applied to his 
own situation, Dr. Panos replied that, "I see he's extreme to the point 
where there is no flexibility at all." (p. 13), 
After argument from counsel that the Defendant be found not competent 
to proceed, based on the Defendant's inability to engage in a reasoned 
discussion of options, and the defendant's inability to accept "what his attorney 
will tell him is the legal status when he very strongly believes that there are 
these other possibilities4 or that he's being persecuted," the Defendant was 
found competent to proceed. The Court ruled, finding that, "the Defendant was 
an extremely intelligent person who understands probably to a greater degree 
than most other members of society the nature of the proceedings against him 
and he is competent to understand that and.. .he was competent to participate 
4
 Reference here is made to Dr. Panos' earlier testimony that one of the Defendant's delusions was that he 
believed he would receive redress in these matters from the federal court, or the World Court, and that his 
attorney could not persuade him otherwise, p. 8. 
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meaningfully in the preparation and presentation of his defense. The only 
reservation that Dr. Panos had was in the area of maybe Mr. Gedo not being 
willing to weight, or not being able or willing to weight pros and cons of 
accepting a plea bargain or something like that be he's elected to go to trial. 
And I think, I think that that's probably a pretty reasonable response of 
somebody that wants to go have their day in court." (p. 19). 
The lower Court should have found the competency evaluations 
inadequate and ruled the Defendant incompetent when the evaluator used an 
inappropriate standard in determining the competency of the Defendant. While 
the evaluator found that the Defendant suffered from a mental illness, and 
found that he had an inability to participate in the proceedings against him with 
a reasonable degree of rational understanding, as required under 77-15-2; and a 
lack of an ability to engage in reasoned choice of legal strategies and options, 
yet, because the doctor operated under a misconception of what the law 
required, his report indicated that he found the defendant competent. The 
lower court should have corrected this misapplication of the law. 
On review by this Court, the Court of Appeals should review for plain 
error whether the trial court should have deemed the competency evaluations 
inadequate, Arguelles at 747. Any factual findings by the court should be 
reviewed using a clearly erroneous standard, Harmon at 1199. 
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There have been indications throughout the Defendant's contacts with 
the lower Court that there could be a concern regarding the Defendant's 
competency. Even the many motions filed with the Court which are the basis 
of the first two arguments in this appeal should indicate an imbalance with the 
Defendant's mental competency. As well, the motions filed by counsel to 
withdraw from representation demonstrate a difficulty on the Defendant's part 
to engage with counsel in a reasoned choice of legal strategies and options. 
Certainly these examples were due to the mental illness suffered by the 
Defendant which was diagnosed by his evaluators as paranoid delusional 
thinking and personality disorder. (See evaluations which are part of the court 
record). 
Appellant argues that the competency evaluation was inadequate because 
it relied on an improper requirement regarding a finding of mental illness. 
Even though Dr. Panos testified that he believed the Defendant to be 
delusional, paranoid and had a personality disorder, he felt constrained that the 
"statute" did not allow him to find this to be mental illness. However, the 
doctor believed that the Defendant did have a mental illness, as demonstrated 
when he testified that the Defendant could not engage in a reasoned choice of 
legal strategies and options, saying, "I'm of the opinion that it's due to mental 
illness," (Competency Hearing, p. 9). 
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Even so, the Court decided that the Defendant could engage in a 
reasoned choice of legal strategies and options, finding, "I'm not finding 
anything that would, here that would because of mental disease or defect 
would, would, would [sic] defeat Mr. Gedo's ability to meaningfully 
participate in his defense. In fact, it sounds like he's made a pretty rational 
choice here. And so Fm going to find that he is competent now, to proceed to 
trial and, and to help with his defense," (Competency Hearing, p. 20). 
In State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, (Sup Court 2001) the Court held that it 
was harmless error where the written competency reports did not specifically 
address all of the factors listed in section 77—15-5 but all the relevant factors 
were addressed through the reports and subsequent hearing. In State v. 
Arguelles, 63 P.3d at 749, the Utah Supreme Court found a similar situation, 
stating that, "[although the written reports do not use the precise language of 
the statute or organize their analysis by the statutory factors, the reports, in 
combination with the testimony offered at the competency hearing, specifically 
address Arguelles' abilities in such a way that all the relevant statutory factors 
are considered. 
We are not arguing that the relevant statutory factors were not 
considered, or that some factors were left out of the evaluations and not 
considered; our argument is that they were considered and specific items 
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included in the evaluations of both doctors and in the testimony itself of Dr. 
Panos that do address specific factors in such a way that a finding of 
incompetency should have been made, yet due to a confusion of the doctors 
regarding what was required for a finding of mental illness, that he was not 
found incompetent. 
In State v. Lafferty, at 1249, the Court found that "the relevant inquiry 
[under section 77-15-2] is whether [the defendant] had the ability to assist 
counsel, not whether he in fact chose to assist counsel or to comply with all of 
counsel's wishes5' (emphasis in original.) 
Here, the Defendant lacked the ability to assist counsel. Based on 
the doctor's findings, the defendant lacked the ability to assist counsel. 
When Dr. Panos was asked on the stand whether the defendant could 
"engage in reasoned choice of legal strategies and options," Dr. Panos 
testified that "I questioned whether he could rationally evaluate, you 
know, realistic options." (Panos Testimony p. 8). Dr. Panos went on to 
state that "no, he would not engage in reasonable consideration of 
options, that he would be locked into, to his, belief systems." (p. 8). And 
with respect to the defendant's relationship with his legal counsel, "he 
tended to lecture you about the legal precedence and the interpretation, 
34 
and he did not see you as being knowledgeable in any realistic sense." 
(P-9) 
In sum, the lower court erred in finding the Defendant competent; 
perhaps based in part on the evaluating doctors' confusion about the 
requirements under Sections 77-15-2 and 77-15-5(4). That therefore the 
Defendant's convictions should be dismissed as an incompetent person 
cannot with any due process, be required to stand trial. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Gedo asks this Court, should it 
rule in Appellant's favor on Points I and/or II, which relate to error 
which Appellant claims in that his motions filed with the court were not 
allowed due process, to reverse his convictions for Disorderly Conduct, 
an Infraction; and Interference with an Arresting Officer, a Class B 
misdemeanor. Further, should this court rule, finding that the lower 
court erred in finding the Defendant competent, Defendant's convictions 
should be dismissed as an incompetent person cannot with any due 
process, be required to stand trial 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 18th day of January, 2006. 
.aura H. Cabanilla 
Counsel for Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
Section 12 Rights of Accused persons, Utah Constitution states that "In 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel...." 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the court (whether by 
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), an attorney or unrepresented 
party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and 
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 
(5) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of the 
litigation; 
(6) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are 
warranted b y existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; 
(7) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary 
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support 
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 
(8) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence 
or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or 
belief 
Rule 8 Utah Rules Civil Procedure 
General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether 
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain 
(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems 
himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be 
demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his 
defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon 
which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information 
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and 
this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the 
averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a 
qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and 
material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good 
faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he may make 
his denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he 
may generally deny all the averments except such designated averments or 
paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend to controvert all 
its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the obligations set 
forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set 
forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption 
of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, 
failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, 
license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, 
waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. 
When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a 
counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat 
the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted 
when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which 
no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or 
avoided. 
Rule 7(b) URCP Motions 
An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made 
during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court commissioner, shall 
be made in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in writing and state 
succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and the grounds for the relief 
sought. 
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Section 77-15-2. Definition of "Incompetent to Proceed" 
a person is incompetent to proceed if he is suffering from a mental 
disorder or mental retardation resulting either in: 
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him or the punishment specified for the offense 
charged; or 
(2) his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the 
proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding 
77-15-5 Order for hearing — Stay of other proceedings — Examinations of 
defendant — Scope of examination and report. 
(1) When a petition is filed pursuant to Section 77-15-3 raising the issue of 
the defendant's competency to stand trial or when the court raises the issue of 
the defendant's competency pursuant to Section 77-15-4, the court in which 
proceedings are pending shall stay all proceedings. If the proceedings are in a 
court other than the district court in which the petition is filed, the district court 
shall notify that court of the filing of the petition. The district court in which 
the petition is filed shall pass upon the sufficiency of the allegations of 
incompetency. If a petition is opposed by either party, the court shall, prior to 
granting or denying the petition, hold a limited hearing solely for the purpose 
of determining the sufficiency of the petition. If the court finds that the 
allegations of incompetency raise a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's 
competency to stand trial, it shall enter an order for a hearing on the mental 
condition of the person who is the subject of the petition. 
(2) (a) After the granting of a petition and prior to a full competency 
hearing, the court may order the Department of Human Services to examine the 
person and to report to the court concerning the defendant's mental condition. 
(b) The defendant shall be examined by at least two mental health experts 
not involved in the current treatment of the defendant. 
(c) If the issue is sufficiently raised in the petition or if it becomes apparent 
that the defendant may be incompetent due to mental retardation, at least one 
3 
expert experienced in mental retardation assessment shall evaluate the 
defendant. Upon appointment of the experts, the petitioner or other party as 
directed by the court shall provide information and materials to the examiners 
relevant to a determination of the defendant's competency and shall provide 
copies of the charging document, arrest or incident reports pertaining to the 
charged offense, known criminal history information, and known prior mental 
health evaluations and treatments. 
(d) The prosecuting and defense attorneys shall cooperate in providing the 
relevant information and materials to the examiners, and the court may make 
the necessary orders to provide the information listed in Subsection (2)(c) to 
the examiners. The court may provide in its order for a competency 
examination of a defendant that custodians of mental health records pertaining 
to the defendant shall provide those records to the examiners without the need 
for consent of the defendant or further order of the court. 
(3) During the examination under Subsection (2), unless the court or the 
executive director of the department directs otherwise, the defendant shall be 
retained in the same custody or status he was in at the time the examination 
was ordered. 
(4) The experts shall in the conduct of their examination and in their report 
to the court consider and address, in addition to any other factors determined to 
be relevant by the experts: 
(a) the defendant's present capacity to: 
(i) comprehend and appreciate the charges or allegations against him; 
(ii) disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind; 
(iii) comprehend and appreciate the range and nature of possible penalties, 
if applicable, that may be imposed in the proceedings against him; 
(iv) engage in reasoned choice of legal strategies and options; 
(v) understand the adversary nature of the proceedings against him; 
(vi) manifest appropriate courtroom behavior; and 
(vii) testify relevantly, if applicable; 
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(b) the impact of the mental disorder, or mental retardation, if any, on the 
nature and quality of the defendant's relationship with counsel; 
(c) if psychoactive medication is currently being administered: 
(i) whether the medication is necessary to maintain the defendant's 
competency; and 
(ii) the effect of the medication, if any, on the defendant's demeanor and 
affect and ability to participate in the proceedings. 
(5) If the expert's opinion is that the defendant is incompetent to proceed, 
the expert shall indicate in the report: 
(a) which of the above factors contributes to the defendant's incompetency; 
(b) the nature of the defendant's mental disorder or mental retardation and 
its relationship to the factors contributing to the defendant's incompetency; 
(c) the treatment or treatments appropriate and available; and 
(d) the defendant's capacity to give informed consent to treatment to restore 
competency. 
Amendment XIV, Section 1, United States Constitution 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein 
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 12, Rights of Accused personsvUtah Constitution, 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend 
in person and by counsel... 
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